Computing in Covert Domain Using Data Hiding by Qian, Zhenxing et al.
1Abstract—This paper proposes an idea of data computing in
the covert domain (DCCD). We show that with information
hiding some data computing tasks can be executed beneath the
covers like images, audios, random data, etc. In the proposed
framework, a sender hides his source data into two covers and
uploads them onto a server. The server executes computation
within the stego and returns the covert computing result to a
receiver. With the covert result, the receiver can extract the
computing result of the source data. During the process, it is
imperceptible for the server and the adversaries to obtain the
source data as they are hidden in the cover. The transmission can
be done over public channels. Meanwhile, since the computation
is realized in the covert domain, the cloud cannot obtain the
knowledge of the computing result. Therefore, the proposed idea
is useful for cloud computing.
Index Terms—Information hiding, covert computation
I. INTRODUCTION
ith the development of big data and cloud computing,
many security problems appear, e.g., privacy disclosure
[1], data abuse [2], malicious attacks [3]. Therefore, many data
protection algorithms have been proposed for data storage and
computing. One important task of protection is to conceal the
content of sensitive data. For example, during cloud computing
the users always hope that the cloud can process the committed
data without knowing its content [4]. Data encryption is one of
the most effective and popular means of privacy protection [5].
However, protection by encryption would inevitably impact the
utility of cloud computing.
As present, the most popular approaches to achieve secure
computation for cloud is signal processing in encrypted domain
[6-9]. As shown in Fig. 1, a sender encrypts his source data (the
sensitive information that cannot be exposed to the others), and
uploads the encrypted versions to the cloud sever. The server
executes computing within the encrypted data without knowing
the content of source data, and returns the computing results to a
receiver. Finally, the receiver decrypts the returned results to
obtain the computation results the of source data. Homomorphic
encryption algorithms were proposed to achieve these goals.
After encrypting the data into a ciphertext with tremendous bits,
additive or multiplicative operations can be done in encrypted
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domain. As the computation complexity [10-12] is very large,
homomorphic encryption is not convenient for common users or
mobile devices.
Fig. 1 Computation in encrypted domain using encryption
In this paper, we propose a novel idea of secure computation,
i.e., data computing in in the covert domain (DCCD). Different
from the encrypted domain, the covert domain is a space
generated by information hiding that can accommodate data
inside a cover. The covers can be images, videos, audios, noise,
or even random data, etc. Traditionally, information hiding is
also called steganography, which is used to transmit secret
message covertly over public channels. Many works have been
done on steganography, e.g., LSB, JSteg, ZZW, STC, etc. We
find that information hiding can also be used for cloud
computing. On the one hand, data privacy can be protected
since the data are embedded inside the covers. On the other
hand, both the additive and multiplicative operations can be
realized in the covert data. As shown in Fig. 2, A sender embeds
his source data into covers, and then uploads the obtained stegos
to a server. For the ease of illustration we use images as covers
for example. The server executes computing within the covers
and returns the stego with computing result to the receiver. The
receiver extracts the computation result of the source data. In
this framework, no information of the original data can be
obtained by the server. Meanwhile, the computation complexity
is much smaller than the homomorphic encryption. Besides, the
source data are secure to be transmitted over public channels
since the data are hidden inside the covers.
Fig. 2 Computation in covert domain using information hiding
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II.PROPOSEDMETHOD
The proposed framework of DCCD is shown in Fig. 3. We
use digital images as covers to show the process of DCCD. A
sender hopes to calculate φ(m1,m2) in the server, while keep
m1 and m2 secret to the server, where m1 and m2 are the
source data, and φ(·) is a calculation operator.
To achieve this goal, the sender embeds m1 and m2 into the
cover images X1 and X2 with data hiding key K, respectively.
The stego images Y1 and Y2 are then uploaded onto the server.
The server executes the computation f(Y1,Y2) using Y1 and Y2
without any knowledge of m1 and m2. After that, the stego Y'
containing computation result is obtained. With Y' the receiver
is able to extract the computation result φ(m1, m2).
The computation is done in the covert domain generated by
data hiding. Many algorithms can be used to realize the
proposed DCCD. For the ease of explanation, we use the
matrix embedding in LSB (Least Significant Bitplane) as
examples to illustrate the proposed idea.
A. Source data embedding
Let the source data be binary sequences, i.e., m1=[m1(1),
m1(2), …, m1(k)]T∈{0,1}k×1, m2=[m2(1), m2(2), …, m2(k)]T∈
{0,1}k×1. To conceal m1 and m2, two cover images X1=[x1(i,
j)]w×r and X2=[x2(i, j)]w×r is used, where i∈{1, 2, …, w}, j∈{1,
2, …, r}. The LSB c1=[c1(i, j)]∈{0,1}w×r and c2=[c2(i, j)]∈
{0,1}w×r of X1 and X2 are used for embedding, as shown in (1)
and (2).
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Next, we use matrix embedding method [13] to embed m1
into c1. With a data hiding key K, we generate an binary
matrix H= [h(u,v)]∈{0, 1}k×wr, where u∈{1, 2, …, k}, v∈{1,
2, …, wr}. The data hiding key is shared by the sender and the
receiver. The process of data embedding is to make (3) true by
modifying the elements in c1 to generate 1cˆ .
11 cˆHm  (3)
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T ∈
{0,1}wr×1 is obtained by cascading the rows in c1, as shown in
(4), t∈{1, 2, …, wr} and “   ” is the floor rounding operator.
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Subsequently, we substitute the LSB c1 in X1 to achieve the
stego Y1.
The procedure of embedding m2 into c2 is the same as
embedding m1 into c1. After cascading the rows in c2 to obtain
2cˆ = [ )1(ˆ2c , )2(ˆ2c , …, )(ˆ2 wrc ]
T∈{0,1}wr×1, we make (5) true
by modifying the elements in c2 to achieve 2cˆ . Therefore, the
stego Y2 is obtained.
22 cˆHm  (5)
After the data embedding, we upload the stego images Y1
and Y2 to the server. Without the data hiding key, the content
of m1 and m2 cannot be revealed. This security performance
will be demonstrated in Subsection III. C.
B.Computation in Covert Domain
With the stego images Y1 and Y2, the server can execute the
computation task f(Y1,Y2), which is equivalent to φ(m1,m2) in
the plaintext domain. Next, we discuss three cases of binary
calculations φ(·) in the covert domain, i.e.,
φ1(m1,m2) = m1 + m2,
φ2(m1,m2) = T21mm ,
φ3(m1,m2) = 2
T
1mm .
These operations are widely used outsourcing computation
[14,15], image retrieval [16,17], privacy protection [18,19],
etc.
i) Case One
For the case of φ1(m1,m2), we use
f(Y1,Y2) = 1cˆ + 2cˆ (6)
In this way, the LSB c= [ ),( jic ]∈{0,1}w×r of Y' is
),(),(),( 21 jiyjiyjic  (7)
After cascading, the obtained binary sequence cˆ = [ )1(cˆ ,
)2(cˆ , …, )(ˆ wrc ]T∈{0,1}wr×1 is
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After that, the server replaces the LSB of Y1 by cˆ to generate
the final Y', which is sent to the receiver.
According to (3) and (5), the receiver can obtain
2121
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Therefore, the result extracted from Y' is φ1(m1, m2) = m1 +
m2.
ii) Case Two
For the case of φ2(m1,m2), we calculate
f(Y1, Y2)= T21ˆˆˆ ccc  ,
and put back the results into the LSB of Y1 to generate Y'.
The receiver can obtain the result of T21mm by
Tˆ HcH 
because of
T
21mm =
T
21 )ˆ(ˆ cHcH =
TT
21
ˆˆ HccH =
Tˆ HcH  . (11)
iii) Case Three
For the case of φ3(m1,m2) = 2
T
1mm , we use
f(Y1, Y2)= 2
T
1
ˆˆˆ ccc  .
The server calculates
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Once the embedding matrix H is an orthogonal matrix, i.e.,
HT·H = I
The result of (12) is equal to
2
T
1mm = 2
T
1
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After that, the server replaces the LSB of Y1 by cˆ to generate
the final Y'.
As cˆ is equal to 2T1mm , the server can obtain the calculation
result. In order to protect the result, the sender can multiply
the source data m1 and m2 with two factors, respectively. On
the other side, the receiver can remove these factors to obtain
the real result. Therefore, the security of data computation can
be guaranteed.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have conducted many experiments to verify the DCCD
idea. In this section, we show the feasibility, imperceptibility,
security performance, and computational complexity of the
proposed paradigm.
A.Feasibility
We use two random binary sequences with 1000 bits are
used as m1 and m2. As shown in Fig. 4, the test images Lena
and Baboon sized 512×512 are used as the cover X1 and X2.
After data embedding, m1 and m2 are embedded into X1 and
X2 to generate the stego images Y1 and Y2, as shown in Fig. 5.
The stego images are indistinguishable from cover images.
Therefore, the imperceptibility of the source data can be
realized. More analysis about the imperceptibility of m1 and
m2 are shown in Fig. 6.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4 Cover images (a) Lena; (b) Baboon.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5 Stego images (a) Lena containingm1; (b) Baboon containing
m2.
Next, we process DCCD with Y1 and Y2 using the
algorithms described in subsection II.B. The result extract
form the covert domain are then compared with φ(m1, m2).
The difference ratio between φ(m1, m2) and the extracted
result are shown in Table 1. For all cases, the difference ratio
is zero. It means the receiver can obtain φ(m1,m2) after data
extraction. Hence, the proposed method is feasible.
Table 1. Difference ratio between φ(m1,m2) and the extracted result
φ(m1,m2) m1 + m2
T
21mm 2
T
1mm
Difference ratio 0 0 0
B. Imperceptibility
To verify the imperceptibility of the source data statistically,
we use all 1338 images sized 512×384 in UCID [20] as cover
images. Each image is embedded with capacity 1000, 2000,
3000, 4000, and 5000 bits respectively using the proposed
method. The imperceptibility of the source data can be
checked by modern steganalytic methods which are based on
the supervised machine learning [21]. Specifically, we employ
the popular steganalytic feature extraction methods SPAM
[22], SRMQ1 [23], SRM [23], and PSRM [24] with an
ensemble classifier [25]. One half of the cover and stego
feature sets are used for training, while the remaining sets are
used for testing. The criterion of evaluating the performance
of feature sets is the minimal total error PE with identical
priors achieved on the testing sets [25].
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where PFA is the false alarm rate and PMD the missed detection
rate. The performance is evaluated using the average of PE
over ten random tests. A higher PE value stands for a better
imperceptibility.
Fig. 6 Imperceptibility of data embedding.
The imperceptibility of data embedding is shown in Fig. 6.
The values of PE keep a high level for all cases. It is difficult
to discover the embedded source data from the stego images.
Thus, the imperceptibility can be guaranteed. In addition, the
values of PE are close to 0.5 (the bound of PE) for small
capacity (such than 1000 bits). The result indicates that the
existence of source data is completely undetectable using the
modern steganalysis tools when capacity is less than 1000 bits.
Therefore, the specific attention and unwanted attack existing
in encrypted domain can be avoided in the covert domain.
C.Security performance
In the proposed framework of DCCD, the content of source
data should not be leaked to the server. In other words, the
content of m1 and m2 cannot be obtained without data hiding
key. To verify the security of source data, we also use the
images in UCID as covers. Each image is embedded with
capacity 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, and 5000 bits, respectively.
Next, a binary matrix with random bits (without data hiding
key) is generated for each stego image to extract source data.
Meanwhile, a binary matrix generated using data hiding key is
used for data extraction. The average ratio of data extraction
error is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Data extraction error with/without data hiding key.
Capacity (bits) 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Error with data
hiding key (%)
0 0 0 0 0
Error without data
hiding key (%)
50.02 49.96 49.97 49.96 49.95
The result show that the data extraction error is around 50%
(the bound of extraction error) for all cases. It means the
content of source data would not be leaked without the data
hiding key. On the other hand, the source data can be extracted
correctly (data extraction error is 0%) when data hiding key is
known. Therefore, the security of the proposed method can be
guaranteed.
D.Computational complexity
While the complexity of computation in the encrypted
domain is huge, the complexity of computing in the covert
domain is smaller. To verify the efficiency of the proposed
DCCD scheme, source data with 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, and
5000 bits are embedded into image Lena, respectively.
Meanwhile, the same source data is encrypted using RSA with
the key sized 256 bits. The complexity comparison between
the proposed DCCD and the RSA is shown in Fig. 7. These
results are generated on a serve with 1.8 GHz CPU, 8 GB
memory and windows 10. The type of system is 64 bits and
the version of MATLAB is R2017b.
The result show that the computational complexity of
DCCM is much smaller than that of RSA for all cases. In
addition, the computational complexity of RSA increases
when a longer key is used. Thus, the proposed DCCD idea is
more convenient for cloud computing.
Fig. 7 computational complexity comparison.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a new idea of achieving secure computation in
the covert domain using data hiding. A practical method is
designed to implement the binary additive and multiplication
calculations. As the source data are hidden in the covers, it is
imperceptible for the cloud and the adversaries to obtain the
data. Meanwhile, as the computation is realized in the covert
domain, the cloud cannot obtain the computation data and the
result. On the recipient side, the computation result can be
obtained after data extraction. Experimental results show the
effectiveness of the proposed DCCD idea. To the best of our
knowledge, it is the first work on computing in covert domain.
More works on this topic can be done in the future.
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